Dissertations & Theses - Gradworks

Abstract:

While launching pre-emptive military strikes and extending U.S. security guarantees are often analyzed as ways to prevent nuclear proliferation, little attention has been paid to using conventional arms transfers to curb nuclear proliferation. Leaders of countries with nuclear aspirations, however, have repeatedly argued that if their country received more arms from the United States, they would have less incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. This dissertation explores the policy-relevant question of whether conventional arms transfers can curb nuclear proliferation by examining how arms sales can increase the arms recipient's military capabilities and strengthen the recipient's alliance with the United States. Since Washington does not provide arms to adversaries, this study focuses on U.S. nonproliferation efforts toward allied and neutral countries.

I combine quantitative analysis with historical case studies to analyze the effect of U.S. arms transfers on nuclear proliferation during the Cold War. Using an original dyadic dataset, I statistically model nuclear proliferation as involving two stages: first initiating one of two types of nuclear weapons programs and then assembling a nuclear bomb. For allied and neutral countries, I find that U.S. arms sales typically prevent nuclear proliferation whereas arms embargoes may encourage proliferation. The exceptions occur at the second stage of proliferation: arms embargoes are likely to prevent U.S. allies from assembling the bomb and arms sales may motivate allies to acquire the bomb. In other words, allies may take U.S. arms sales for granted, but may cooperate when sanctioned.

In-depth case studies of Israel, South Korea, and Pakistan support the statistical findings, but also reveal that arms sales provide the U.S. leverage over all nuclear aspiring countries regardless of the maturity of the arms recipient's nuclear weapons program. U.S. arms transfers to Israel encouraged Tel Aviv to delay production of nuclear weapons until 1967 and to manufacture nuclear weapons at a slow rate until 1973. After the 1973 October War, U.S. arms sales could not prevent Israel from expanding its nuclear arsenal but did encourage Israel to never publicly test, demonstrate, or use its nuclear weapons. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, Washington combined reassurances with the threat of ending the U.S.-ROK security relationship – including terminating the U.S. arms supply – to pressure South Korea into shelving its nuclear project. After South Korea restarted its nuclear program in the late 1970s, Seoul again canceled the program in exchange for U.S. support and arms. On the other hand, Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons began in 1972, after the country suffered two military defeats and a sustained U.S. arms embargo. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, allowed Pakistan to enjoy a stronger U.S. commitment and substantial U.S. arms sales. In the 1980s, Islamabad continued to seek nuclear weapons but limited its activities: it did not test a nuclear device or delivery vehicle and delayed the assembly of a nuclear bomb.

Though arms transfers may not be able to completely reverse or contain mature nuclear weapons programs, arms sales can delay nuclear proliferation and buy the international community more time to deal with the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Arms embargoes, on the other hand, are more likely to reinforce a country's perceived need for nuclear weapons.