Battle-scarred and dirty: US Army tactical leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942--1943
by Barry, Steven Thomas, Ph.D., THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011, 336 pages; 3493283

Abstract:

Throughout the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the battalion leadership exercised by United States regular army officers provided the essential component that contributed to battlefield success and combat effectiveness despite deficiencies in equipment, organization, mobilization, and inadequate operational leadership. Essentially, without the regular army battalion leaders, US units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. For both Operations TORCH and HUSKY, the US Army did not possess the leadership or staffs at the corps level to consistently coordinate combined arms maneuver with air and sea power. The battalion leadership brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality. Many US officers shared the same “Old Army” skill sets in their early career. Across the Army in the 1930s, these officers developed familiarity with the systems and doctrine that would prove crucial in the combined arms operations of the Second World War. The battalion tactical leadership overcame lackluster operational and strategic guidance and other significant handicaps to execute the first Mediterranean Theater of Operations campaigns. Three sets of factors shaped this pivotal group of men. First, all of these officers were shaped by pre-war experiences. Professional military education, unit training exercises, and commissioning source formed the foundation of how the Army prepared these officers for leadership and combat. This group of officers shared many of the same personal factors that consistently provided sound leadership in North Africa and Sicily. While less tangible than institutional factors, the personal factors include bravery, calmness under fire, vigor, and common personality traits. Finally, the officers’ deft use of doctrine, assigned equipment, mission-oriented orders, and their ability to overcome operational limitations translated into tactical combat effectiveness. The analysis of these three categories above determined that these battalion-level professional officers were the critical cogs for early Allied success in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

 
AdviserAllan R. Millett
SchoolTHE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
SourceDAI/A 73-05, p. , Feb 2012
Source TypeDissertation
SubjectsEuropean history; American history; Military history
Publication Number3493283
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