Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in Aristotle's moral and political philosophy, combined with doubts about the view of “nature” on which Aristotle's teaching seems at times to rely. To what extent does Aristotle think that “nature” provides a normative standard for human life? Does Aristotle's political philosophy depend on a teleological conception of nature that is no longer viable?

I address these questions through a careful analysis of Aristotle's account of the naturalness of the city and of slavery in the Politics, along with an examination of the starting point of Aristotle's “political inquiry” and his treatment of happiness and natural justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that Aristotle's characterization of human beings as “political animals by nature” does not in fact reflect an outdated belief in nature's purposes, but rather the dependence of our perceptions of nature or the cosmos on political authority. On my reading, this is the deeper issue underlying Aristotle's infamous account of natural slavery, which also sheds light on why political authority cannot be expected to consist in the rule of reason as distinct from bodily force.

Yet Aristotle indicates that authoritative political opinions are not merely forced upon us, but find powerful support in our natural tendencies as “rational animals.” Accordingly, Aristotle's “political inquiry” begins in the Ethics not from an objective “natural” foundation, but rather, from an attempt to bring to light more fully the conventional opinions we perceive to be true or natural. It is only by proceeding dialectically from our confused and inconsistent opinions about the noble and just things that Aristotle's account leads gradually to a distinction between law or convention and nature.

On my reading, Aristotle's inquiry into happiness and virtue quietly points to the ways in which human beings seek not merely to fulfill their needs but to hide or transcend them. Aristotle thus sheds light on the obstacles to our seeing “nature” clearly. Yet he suggests that precisely by clarifying those obstacles, we may come to a more natural understanding of ourselves and the world.