In my dissertation, I evaluate two traditional threats to free will and moral responsibility: the threat posed by causal determinism , and the threat posed by fatalism. In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. I do so by building on (and, I hope, improving) the so-called manipulation arguments for incompatibilism. Manipulation arguments challenge the compatibilist to distinguish between our actions being deterministically manipulated by other agents and their simply being determined by brute natural chance. I then focus on the threat posed by fatalism. On logical fatalism, from the fact that it was true (say) 1000 years ago that I would write my dissertation, it follows that I could not have done otherwise than write it. And on theological fatalism, from the fact that an infallible God believed 1000 years ago that I would write this dissertation, it follows that I could not have done otherwise than write it. The most promising replies to such arguments ultimately invoke the notion of dependence: it is because we do the things we do that it was true 1000 years ago that we would do these things, or that God then believed we would do these things. The question, however, is what sort of dependence is required, and whether it is plausible to suppose that the various things in the distant past could have depended (in the needed sense) on what we do now. On my account, it turns out that it is fact not plausible that such prior truths (and especially any past divine beliefs) could have depended in the needed sense on what we do. What my results thus suggest is that, if we are to be free and responsible, the future must be open. However, I develop one more or less unknown way of responding to these arguments: that the future is not open, but instead is mutable. Even though I reject this view, I hope to show that it has far more going for it than we have yet realized.