Physicalists, according to whom everything is physical, typically believe that the mind is the brain and that the former's properties are to be somehow referred to physical properties of the latter. Physicalists, then, had better be able to explain how consciousness, an absolutely central feature of the mind, comes from the physical. This challenge is not yet met; in fact, some think it probably never will be. The contention here is that the physicalist's difficulties are blown out of proportion. Physicalists have a way to explain at least some consciousness and potentially very much of it.

This thesis is advanced primarily in Chapter Four. The first three chapters pave the way to it. Chapter One details the physicalist's problem of consciousness, also known as the explanatory gap. Chapter Two surveys problematic definitions of 'physical' and presents a temporary fix that some endorse, including some who advance the explanatory gap. Chapter Three argues against the temporary fix and suggests that it just might create more problems than it solves: for example, the problem of consciousness. That, it turns out, is an overstatement. Still, by seeing what physicalists can do once the "fix" is discontinued (in Chapter Four), a better view can be found. From that view, one can explain at least some consciousness and potentially very much of it. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)