Many of us value democracy at least in part because it promises to respect the political equality of citizens: the idea that each member of society is equally authoritative over matters of common life. But it is not obvious what that abstract idea implies about how we ought to design collective decision-making institutions. Even in relatively longstanding democracies, controversies remain about the proper democratic design of legislatures, election systems, and the judiciary, to take some important examples. Resolving these disputes requires some understanding of why political equality is valuable and important, and what it requires of our decision-making institutions.

I argue that political equality requires institutions and practices that respect the equal political status of citizens. I criticize the common view that political equality primarily involves equality of power—for example, equal voting power. This narrow form of equality unduly focuses on the moment of translating citizens’ judgments into common decisions, and fails to attend to citizens’ interests in fairness throughout decision-making processes that extend over time.

I claim instead that political equality requires what I call the appropriate consideration of each citizen’s judgments. Instead of attempting to distribute to citizens what I call narrow command authority over the laws, democratic regimes ought to guarantee to citizens a variety of forms of consideration—that is, ways the regime will take each citizen’s views into account in the decision-making process. I analyze different forms of meaningful consideration, and explain how the ideal of equal political status regulates what consideration is due to citizens. I propose some general principles for fairly aggregating citizens’ judgments into a common decision, as well as principles for fair political deliberation. I then discuss what these general principles imply for some controversies relating to the representation of groups in legislatures.

I do not attempt to vindicate the claim that justice requires political equality. I aim, however, to elaborate what political equality requires for those who are committed democrats, and to inform the question of how justice and democracy relate by improving our understanding of what the latter involves, and why it morally matters.