In my dissertation I offer a topical critique of the language of early analytic philosophy. My critique focuses on the factors that shaped the tradition's linguistic inventory. Among these factors, I pay special attention to the direct influence the new analytic arguments and methodologies had on the formation of the specialized language of analysis. In this, I argue that early analytic philosophy is not only distinguished by a tendency of economizing language, as early analytic thinkers readily admitted, but also by the heretofore unstudied effort to ostracize words and expressions that could in any way challenge their new philosophical programs. I attempt to prove that, in result of the latter, early analytic philosophers isolated themselves from alternative ways of doing philosophy and, more importantly, sacrificed some of the understandability of their arguments. My method consists of the analysis of specific arguments by particular philosophers with a view on both the formation of their language choices and the way these choices in turn influence the arguments themselves. My primary examples of the tendencies discussed come from the writings of Moore, Neurath, and Wittgenstein. I also look into the importance of professional conformism for the way the language of early analytic philosophy has been inherited by subsequent generations of analysts. My example here is Searle and, more specifically, his compromised treatment of Derrida's reading of Austin. In conclusion, I explore the issues of language choice, understandability of arguments, modes of inheritance, and philosophical motivation as discussed by Wisdom and Cavell. In the latter two philosophers, I find both eloquent proof for the relevance of the problems that concern my study and, also, fresh suggestions as to how these problems are to be dealt with philosophically.