This dissertation asks when will states consider human rights in foreign policy decisions, specifically using foreign aid to punish human rights violators. I argue that to understand why and when states react to human rights violations abroad, we must consider the domestic political context that donors face, as well as the relationship between the donor and recipient. The decisions to use foreign policy tools to pursue a human rights agenda are part of a larger framework of foreign policy decisions. Incorporating a broader understanding of foreign policy, and the domestic political context that informs foreign policy, will provide a more robust understanding of human rights foreign policy. Building on the existing literature regarding foreign aid, I argue that human rights matter under specific conditions. In particular, when nongovernmental organizations act in an information-providing role and draw attention to violations, policymakers are more likely to perceive political benefits to doing something. At the same time, the opportunity costs of acting - measured in terms of other foreign policy goals - must be low. Further, I consider how political institutions affect the incentive structure of politicians to act in response to human rights violations. I find preliminary support for my hypothesis that NGO pressure mediates the effect of human rights on foreign aid. In addition, I find some support that the economic or strategic relationships between donors and recipients modify this effect to some extent, although sometimes the direction of this relationship runs counter to my expectations.