In studies pertaining to Twain's complex philosophical concerns and perspectives, scholars have for the most part missed the mark, identifying Twain as a pessimist, determinist, or solipsist, but none of these adequately describe his position.

Twain was clearly skeptical, but he was a lover of wisdom, searching long and hard for "truths." He simply could not accept dogma because inherent in any idea were contradictions, and to claim an idea as an "absolute truth," undeniable, without contradictions and logical inconsistencies, this Twain could not do. Twain often chose, however, to look beyond the contradictions in ideas, and if an idea was useful for him, he chose temporarily treat it "as if" it were the "truth" even if he knew it wasn't and never could be understood as "truth." All previous scholars have missed this aspect of his philosophy.

In order to understand the apparent contradictions in Twain's writing, I refer to the writings of Hans Vaihinger, a renowned Kantian scholar, best known for The Philosophy of 'As If'. Vaihinger's study—which includes analyses of Kant and Nietzsche and references to many other histories of philosophical theories of truth—offers a way to understand how Twain avoided the impasse of nihilism or pure pessimism. With the help of Vaihinger, I analyze some of Twain's representative pieces to exhibit how useful the concept of "as if" is in understanding Twain's varied works: "The Story of the Bad Little Boy" and "A Day at Niagara"—followed by The Innocents Abroad, Life on the Mississippi, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, and end with No. 44, The Mysterious Stranger . These narratives will demonstrate that very often Twain espoused a position that Vaihinger later defended: the philosophy of "As If" which advocates philosophical and conceptual discourse, claiming that "truth" is no more than "warranted assertability," where ideational constructs are treated provisionally "as if" they were the truth, only if and when they are useful.