In common parlance, fatalism is usually thought of as the thesis that whatever happens must happen because it is somehow meant to happen. Philosophically, it is the thesis that the laws of logic, i.e. the Aristotelian laws of logic, are sufficient to deny freedom of the will. Accordingly, agents have neither control over what they do or over what happens to them nor moral responsibility because of their lack of free will; deliberation over their actions, then, is to be considered superfluous, at best.

There are those individuals who believe that no freedom-restricting mechanism, such as determinism—which is a denial of free will due to causal forces—is compatible with moral responsibility; this is incompatibilism. Likewise, there are those who believe that freedom-restricting mechanisms do nothing to diminish moral responsibility; this is compatibilism. Additionally, it is taken for granted that fatalism—a freedom restricting mechanism like determinism—is an issue best understood by examination of logical systems.

It is false that fatalism is an issue best handled by examination of logical systems, since logical systems rely on presuppositions of time seminal to any position concerning fatalism. It is time itself, not logic, and one's views toward time that necessitate the truth of fatalism, but this truth need not impair moral responsibility. Rather than fatalism's being incompatible with moral responsibility, one can easily defend fatalistic compatibilism.