Presidents have invested their time and energy campaigning for members of their own party during midterm elections since the middle of the 20 ^th century. Presidents, their advisors, the media, and the candidates they campaign for all believe the appearances have a positive effect on the outcome of the midterm elections. Yet, little empirical evidence exists suggesting that presidential appearances are anything more than window dressings.

In this dissertation, I examine presidential midterm campaign visits on behalf of candidates for the United States House of Representatives between 1982 and 2006. I find evidence that campaign visits are strategically allocated to competitive House districts which supported the president in his previous electoral bid. I also find that presidential visits are allocated relatively equally to such districts, regardless of whether or not the president's co-partisan is favored to win the election. I examine the effects of presidential visits during midterm elections and find that visits produce little discernible effect on whether a co-partisan wins the election or upon her share of the popular vote. I find evidence of a limited effect on reducing the typical decline in voter turnout in midterm elections in the most competitive House races.