In this dissertation I investigate the import of ecology for Christian cosmology, ethics, and conceptions of salvation. I begin by arguing that ecology gives Christians reason to think that human beings are created mortal. I then claim that if Christians conceive human beings as created mortal, they can no longer consistently maintain that all disvalue is evil since Christians deny that creation intrinsically harbors evil yet death and the decline that often precedes it are generally disvalues for those that endure them. Conventional Christian value theory, however, is binary, and so it deems all disvalue evil. Accordingly I conclude that Christians who embrace an ecologically attractive cosmology should replace their conventional value theory with one that is tripartite. I introduce such a tripartite value theory by distinguishing qualitatively between those disvalues that are necessary for the sustainability of ecologically ordered systems, which I call bad, and those disvalues that are not, which I denominate evil. Although this remedy disassociates evil from ecologically attractive conceptions of creation, it also reveals that these conceptions render organisms as created to depend upon processes that are bad for them. Christians have generally not understood human beings' relationship to disvalue in this way, and so I reinterpret two central Christian doctrines in light of that change. First, I suggest a tripartite account of moral obligation that prohibits doing evil, imperfectly obligates doing good, and with qualification permits doing bad. Next, I advance a vision of salvation that depicts God as delivering from evil and enabling all organisms to live well amidst the bad. Both proposals alter conventional Christian positions on these topics and thus, in conjunction with ecologically attractive cosmology and tripartite value theory, cumulatively indicate ecology's potential Christian significance.