In this dissertation, I argue for a convergence account of the ontological status of the fields of ethics and aesthetics. This project is accomplished in three parts.

In Part I, I defeat six leading arguments in favor of divergence on the basis of principles, properties, obligations, motivation, seriousness, and dilemmas. Defeating each of these divergence arguments offers support for my convergence position.

Part II focuses on moral and aesthetic judgments. I argue that, in both fields, evaluative judgments are formed through a combination of convention, emotion, reason, and a tendency to prefer utility. I offer a two-tiered account of judgment, whereby objective judgments can be reached through an appeal to convention, and subjective judgments allow us to critique the conventions themselves.

As good reason has been given to reject divergence, Part III of the dissertation is focused on determining whether to accept realist or antirealist convergence. Following a discussion regarding who bears the burden of proof in the realist/antirealist debate, an analysis of the implications of accepting divergence is offered, which demonstrates that moral and aesthetic evaluation and discourse is possible under an antirealist view, and a motivation to engage in these activities is not lost.