Patriotism is seen as something positive in our common political discourse; however, among political philosophers it is often seen as an unreflective and irrational love of the familiar. This dissertation explores the question of what precisely patriotism is and whether or not it can be moral. First, I examine Martha Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan critique of patriotism based upon her theory of universal human “capabilities.” Secondly, I explore the concept of “constitutional patriotism,” particularly in the work of Jan-Werner Müller. Constitutional patriotism is a concept, first formulated by Jürgen Habermas, that attempts to make patriotism compatible with liberalism by transforming the object of the patriot’s attachment from a concrete political entity to a set of liberal constitutional principles. Finally, I attempt to construct a conception of patriotism which is both substantive and limited based upon an Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of friendship. I suggest that patriotism has to be understood as acting for the good of one’s political community. In addition, it has to be limited by an understanding of the political community as a finite entity dedicated to the pursuit of one among many possible instantiations of the political good.