The problem addressed in this qualitative case study is the vulnerability of maritime operations within the United States posed by the more than 17 million American recreational maritime vessels. The operators of these unregulated small vessels create a significant opportunity for terrorists to conduct operations against the people, property, and economic stability of the United States. With the small vessel terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and the M/V Limburg in 2002 as context, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials promulgated the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) as a step in countering any possible threat posed by terrorists utilizing a small vessel as a method of delivering harm to American assets. The purpose of this qualitative case study research was to explore operational U.S. Coast Guard multi-mission small boat station crewmembers' and their operational commanders' understanding of the intent of the SVSS. Seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted with crewmembers of U.S. Coast Guard multi-mission small boat stations located in New London, CT, and Boston, MA, and their operational commanders. Within the U.S. Coast Guard, crewmembers of U.S. Coast Guard multi-mission small boat stations have the tactical responsibility to protect America's assets. An iterative inductive analysis approach was used to delineate patterns in the data collected from crewmember interviews. Themes were derived from data patterns through the utilization of a modified Miles and Huber thematic structure process. The results of this study revealed that crewmembers at these U.S. Coast Guard multi-mission small boat stations do not have the awareness or knowledge needed to execute or fully understand the SVSS. Future research should be conducted with other U.S. Coast Guard multi-mission small boat stations to confirm these findings. Additionally, DHS officials should examine the present state of SVSS research to ensure financial and human resources are utilized in a responsible manner.