Renewable energy sources have become increasingly important in the efforts to provide energy security and to fight global warming. In the last decade environmental policy has increased the support for renewable electricity. At the same time the electricity sector was often subject of antitrust investigation because of relevant market concentration, and market power. This dissertation looks at the renewable electricity market to analyze the effect of environmental policy on competition.

The first chapter provides a short introduction into the regulatory schemes of electricity markets. The second chapter analyzes the demand side of the electricity market. The estimations show that there was no significant change in the income and price elasticity in the electricity consumption of the US households between 1993 an 2001, although there was several policy initiatives to increase energy efficiency and decrease consumption.

The third chapter derives a theoretical model where the feed-in tariff and the tradable green certificate system can be analyzed under oligopolistic market structure. The results of the model suggest that the introduction of the environmentally friendly regulatory schemes can decrease the electricity prices compared to the case when there is no support for renewable energy. The other findings of this model is that the price of electricity rises when the requirement for renewable energy increases.

In the fourth chapter a simulation model of the UK electricity market is used to test the effect of mergers and acquisitions under the environmental support scheme. The results emphasize the importance of the capacity limit, because it can constrain the strategic action of the electricity producers. The results of the simulation also suggest that the increasing concentration can increase the production and lower the price of electricity and renewable energy certificates in the British Renewable Obligation system.