This dissertation contributes to the literature on prevention in two specific ways. First, it broadens the concept of preventive war, developing the idea that dominant states have a choice when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. The choice is not a dichotomous variable of either war or no war. Instead, there is a range of choices that decision makers within the dominant state have at their disposal. This dissertation examines the relationship—over time—between two conflictual states, one in relative decline and the other in relative ascendance, and studies the response of the dominant but declining power. Second, I focus more than others have on the perceptions of decision makers and the workings of domestic politics in determining how dominant states respond to rising challengers. I use three broad historical case studies to empirically test my ideas about the extended concept of preventive action. Using components of the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the internal domestic decision making processes of the cases. Finally, I utilize a foreign policy analysis approach and develop a model that illuminates nuances that have been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature.