This dissertation explores the intersection of colonial politics and imperial policy in the eighteenth-century self-governing colony of Connecticut. It asks: How did popular politics shape the colony’s political culture? How did imperial affairs affect local politics? And, most importantly, how did the changing nature of the British Empire after 1763 influence colonial politics?

I approach these issues by examining the political career of Thomas Fitch, who, as Connecticut’s governor from 1754 to 1766, led his colony through the Seven Years’ War and ensuing Stamp Act crisis. A highly ambitious man, Fitch exploited both popular politics and imperial issues to become the first candidate in the eighteenth century to defeat a sitting Connecticut governor in a competitive election. Yet twelve years later, unable to resolve the increasing conflict between imperial demands and popular sentiment, Fitch himself fell victim to an electoral challenge.

I argue that, while Fitch could serve the interests of both empire and colony before 1763, changes in the postwar imperial system, combined with the rise of issue-based local politics, made it impossible for him successfully to promote both interests in the postwar period. When the Stamp Act required the governor to enforce an unpopular imperial tax, Connecticut freemen, anticipating the radical turn of events that would ensue elsewhere a decade later, replaced Fitch and his allies with men who put the interests of the colony ahead of empire.

This dissertation furthers our understanding of the development of popular politics in eighteenth-century America, and provides a fresh perspective on the imperial crisis of the 1760s. Self-governing colonies such as Connecticut are typically excluded from analyses of pre-Revolutionary politics on the assumption that the presence of an elected rather than royally appointed executive eliminated a source of friction found nearly everywhere else. When postwar imperial policy sought to turn even elected governors into instruments of imperial policy, however, it created in Connecticut a political crisis similar to that found elsewhere. Connecticut’s ability to rid itself of Thomas Fitch once he lost popular support meant that its Revolution took place in 1766, not 1776.