This dissertation traces the intellectual development of the British Army, and it focuses on a subset of that Army, the cavalry. It follows the military, social, intellectual, and economic forces that shaped modernization and the development of motorized and armored forces in the British Army. In particular, the author focuses on the reactionary nature of much of the Army's leadership. The author contends that modernization was hampered by conservative elements in the cavalry.

This author highlights research showing that the British cavalry was an important factor in the slow development of British armored forces. Focused research begins around the turn of the twentieth century, which establishes the broad historical and social outlines of the study. Then, the author presents a detailed analysis of both the Boer War and World War I, focusing on military actions and leadership. Next, the author presents an in-depth description of the period between the wars and the often negative attitudes that were held in the British Army on modernization. The research continues with an analysis of the failure of the British Army in 1940 and the evacuation of Dunkirk. Finally, the work closes with the early battles in the western desert in 1941 and the overall implications of the research.