Justice research in the past few decades has demonstrated that people's beliefs of what is fair and not fair have strong and consistent impacts on shaping their thoughts, feelings, and actions. However, we know relatively little about how these fairness judgments are formed, particularly when people lack information that is most relevant in the particular situation. Given the centrality of fairness concerns and ubiquity of uncertainty in social life, a deeper examination of the relationship between these two concepts (fairness judgments and uncertainty) would provide organizational scholars and practitioners with fresh new perspectives to better understand a diverse set of organizational behaviors.

This dissertation aims at extending our understanding of how uncertainty influences fairness judgments and moderates fairness effects by connecting research on behavioral decision making and organizational justice and by conducting three empirical studies using experimental methods. In particular, I focus on the role of information ambiguity, which is a type of uncertainty internal to the fairness judgment process.

The findings of this dissertation are manifold. First and foremost, uncertainty is a complicated and multi-faceted construct and not all uncertainty is equal in its psychological impact on fairness judgments. One particular source of uncertainty internal to the fairness judgment process is missing fairness information. When some component of relevant fairness information is unavailable, heuristic substitution of information otherwise not central to the assessment of fairness will be used in people's fairness judgment, introducing biases in the judgmental process and influencing subsequent attitudes and behaviors. There are also indications that culture plays a role in moderating the way uncertainty affects fairness judgment. Uncertainty in the form of ambiguity of fairness information (due to low quantity or quality of information) reduces positive perceptions of fair treatment but does not buffer the negative effects of vague unfair treatment. In addition, ambiguity only has an effect when it is salient and when the context provides ready opportunity for comparisons between more and less ambiguous situations. Implications of these findings are discussed following each empirical study and summarized in the concluding chapter.