Abstract:

This dissertation is a study of Plotinus' theory of the affections, the emotions and desires attributed in the Platonic tradition to the non-rational soul-parts Spirit and Appetite. In it, I show how Plotinus attempts to resolve questions inherent in the Platonist tradition about (1) the respective role of soul and body in the affections, and (2) the status of the affections in the life of the wise man, on the basis of his own understanding of Platonic commitments. Chapter 1 offers an analysis of the argument, in Enn. I.1.1-7, for the identification of the proper subject of the affections as a 'composite' consisting of the body and a secondary psychic entity (the 'soul-image') comprising those psychic capacities that directly involve the body. Chapter 2 presents a new interpretation of Plotinus' claim, in Enn. III.6.1-5, that the part of soul responsible for the affections is 'impassible.' Since what Plotinus denies the soul are only physical-type changes, he can maintain this position unproblematically by assigning changes of that type to the body, while formulating a contrasting account of the nature of psychic changes. Chapter 3 investigates the theoretical basis for the attribution of quasi-psychic 'proto-desires' to the body in Enn. IV.4.18-20 and 28. This chapter argues that these states, which serve to prompt desiderative states in soul, are made possible by a theoretical novelty (the 'soul-trace') originally posited to explain the immanent vital characteristics of a bodily mass. Chapter 4 draws on Enn. I.2 and I.4 to situate the ethical goal of apatheia ('freedom from affections') in the broader context of Plotinus' eudaimonism. This chapter claims that the goal of apatheia is to be understood not as a complete eradication of affections, but as the position that the wise man's reason stands aloof from the evaluative attitudes ordinarily expressed in them.