The dissertation examines Aristotle’s theory of decision and uncontrolled action. In the first part of the dissertation I explore Aristotle’s account of decision in the context of virtuous actions. I argue that, contrary to the widely accepted view, Aristotle does not conceive of decisions as exclusively rational psychological states. Although decisions are centrally rational psychological states, they can also include as their components nonrational desires. I argue that there are cases of acting on decision in which the nonrational desire for pleasure (appetite) is the main motivating force and in which the agent, in acting on decision, acts for the sake of pleasure. I also explore the close connection between pleasure and virtuous action. I argue that this connection is best understood if we allow that some virtuous decisions of virtuous agents include non-rational desires as their components. As I show, this interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of decision sheds new light on a number of important Aristotelian texts.

In the second part of the dissertation I examine Aristotle’s account of actions due to lack of control in Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 and show how decision is involved at the center of this account. It is in light of his strong assumptions about the motivational power of reason (exemplified through decisions) that Aristotle construes his account of actions due to lack of control in EN 7.3. As I argue, on Aristotle’s view, when an agent engages in an uncontrolled action (i.e., in an action against his decision), he is suffering from a global incapacitation of the ability of practical reasoning due to the effects of appetite. Because of this incapacitation, the agent is prevented from grasping his situation (including the object of his bad non-rational desire) in the light of his knowledge. This failure, although merely symptomatic of the global condition in which the uncontrolled agent (due to his appetite) is, allows the agent’s appetite to take over and initiate uncontrolled action. On Aristotle’s account, appetite can initiate an action independently of reason reacting merely to the way in which the situation appears to and is perceived by the agent.