Realist theories of international relations, in addition to their theoretical focus on the great powers, also assume that great power status is conferred strictly according to the objective power attributes of states, such as geography, population, and military capabilities. However, a close examination of the historical record reveals a number of discrepancies between the power attributes of certain states and their great power status. The present research focuses on the role of war and third party observers to advance a theory that explains these particular discrepancies and also accounts for changes in great power status in general.

The difficulties observers face in assessing the capabilities of states in the international system explains why increases and decreases in material capabilities are not always met by the appropriate changes in great power status. These difficulties are significantly reduced during times of war, allowing observers to make highly accurate assessments of the material capabilities of the belligerents. Thus, changes in great power status are likely to follow war, not because of the material gains or losses experienced as a consequence of the fighting, but because the fighting allows for a clear demonstration of the capabilities the belligerents already possessed. Additionally, the existing great powers play an often decisive role in determining whether a state will attain great power status, with the decision to either promote or hinder the ascents of new great powers being heavily influenced by the political and strategic considerations of the existing great powers in addition to their assessments of material conditions.

Four case studies are conducted to evaluate this theory: the French and Bavarian bids for great power status at the Congress of Vienna, the ascent of the United States to great power status following the Spanish-American War, the rise of Japan to great power status following the Russo-Japanese War, and the fall of Great Britain from great power status following the Suez Crisis.