Probability is one of the most fundamental and widely studied dimensions within the decision-sciences. In the current thesis I approach probability as a dimension of psychological distance, and describe research that examines four implications of this perspective. In Section A, I draw on recent evidence that distance is related to abstraction, to argue that improbable events (which are experienced as remote) are represented in a more abstract and schematic manner than probable events. Across six studies, results support this relationship, emerging on measures of categorization and identification, as well as performance. Section B examines whether the relationship between probability and abstraction described in Section A is bidirectional. In six studies, I find that activating an abstract mindset, or way of processing, attenuates probability judgment. Intriguingly, this effect operates at the level of mindset priming, with procedural manipulations of abstraction influencing subsequently encountered, unrelated probability judgments. In Section C, I extend this analysis to cases where probability information relates to events that have occurred, examining shifts in representation, as well as consequent evaluation. Results suggest that, like improbable future events, items related to events that have occurred, but were improbable to have done so, are represented abstractly; also, evaluation of such items are increasingly driven by more abstract and central item features. Section D closes by substantiating my conceptualization of probability as distance, through examining whether people map probability onto other distance dimensions. Across 6 studies, participants related improbable events to distant places, people, and times, an effect that has implications for prediction (Study 3), reactions of surprise (Study 4), betting behavior (Study 5), and insurance decisions (Study 6). Together, these four sets of studies support a probability as distance approach and the related link between probability and abstraction, suggesting that probability's impact is even more fundamental than previously appreciated.