This dissertation illuminates general processes of political change recurrent through American history that have remained overlooked. It examines what occurs after reformers have succeeded in dismantling institutions integral to the old order, and explicates general political-judicial processes through which changed institutions and resilient institutions undergo a mutual recalibration that results in the creation of a new, largely unanticipated political order. Uncovering these historical processes of "institutional recalibration," as I call them, will offer two primary contributions. First, it will subject the complex pathways of systemic political change to fresh scrutiny, and take direct critical aim at metaphorical concepts such as "punctuated equilibrium" and "critical junctures" that prevail in the literature. Illuminating these overlooked pathways by which the polity reconstitutes itself after the dismantling of significant institutions will thus aid legal theorists and political scientists in fundamentally rethinking the nature of political change. Second, investigation of the processes of recalibration will also illuminate the crucial role played by the Supreme Court during these moments of transformative change, and will demonstrate how judicial institutional interests have played a crucial historical role in influencing judicial behavior.