Bias in weapon development
by Else, Daniel H., Iii, Ph.D., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 2008, 267 pages; 3295050

Abstract:

The weaponry employed by the armed forces of the United States is reputed to be the world's most capable, technologically advanced, and expensive. This dissertation argues that one reason for the heavy reliance on technology is the expectation—the bias—in Congress and the most senior levels in the Department of Defense that each new system must significantly outperform the system it replaces. Other factors, such as specific military threats, national security strategy, military operational doctrine, or the self-interests of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, powerfully influence the directions taken in developing weapons, but development is guided by a technological bias.

Three elements are generally understood to set the path of weapon system design: operational/strategic needs; military self-interest; or single-minded pursuit of technology. In studying three weapons created during the Cold War—the Main Battle Tank (MBT) 70, the M1 Abrams tank, and the Tomahawk cruise missile—I find evidence to support all of these arguments. Yet, analysis shows that each element influences development only when certain circumstances prevail.

In examining the decisions made during the creation of these weapons, I draw four broad conclusions. First, what you see depends on where you look. Analysis focused on engineers or military officers will likely find clear-cut causation patterns, while analysis focused on other actors may reach different conclusions. Second, national security strategy trumps military threat. Though hostile threats are used publicly to support weapon development, strategic considerations dominate weapon development decisions. Third, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is a central actor, and appreciating its relationship to Congress is essential to understanding the final weapon. Finally, the quest for cutting edge technology pervades development to the extent that its impact is both direct, in helping to increase the risk of failure in individual programs, and indirect, in the assumption that all weapons must push the technological boundaries.

 
AdviserJames H. Lebovic
SchoolTHE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
SourceDAI/A 68-12, p. , Mar 2008
Source TypeDissertation
SubjectsPolitical Science; Military history; Military studies
Publication Number3295050
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