In this dissertation I argue that Attila, King of the Huns, must be understood within the context of the combination of his personal identity as a Hun, his obligations as a Hun king, and his interactions with the Roman political and cultural world. In chapter one I consider the evidence for our primary source for this period, the historian Priscus, and argue that he can be regarded as a good source of information on both Huns and Romans. In chapter two I consider the wars Attila fought with the Eastern Roman Empire in 442 and 447, and come to the conclusion that these wars were not predatory attacks on the Roman Empire, but rather were caused by internal weaknesses within the Hun kingdom. In chapter three I consider the attempted assassination of Attila by the Eastern Roman Empire, and come to the conclusion that this attempt was made not because Attila was himself a threat, but rather because of the perception that Attila’s ally Aetius was the primary threat. In chapters four and five I consider Attila’s campaign of 451 against the Western Empire, and come to the conclusion that he attacked the Western Empire as a means of supporting the Empress Honoria, and that his invasion of Gaul was a necessary precursor to any operation in Italy. In chapter six I consider Attila’s failed invasion of Italy in 452, and come to the conclusion that he was able to withdraw because the presence of Pope Leo in a Roman embassy to Attila allowed the latter to present a military defeat as a religious victory to his Hun subjects.