The importance of publicity in Kant's philosophy has generally been underappreciated. 'Publicity' understood in its broadest sense refers to the general condition of being able to communicate one's thoughts and judgments with everyone else, at least in principle. In Kant's work, publicity functions as a vehicle for the growth of knowledge and the development of our cultural, political, scientific, and moral communities. I contend that publicity is a condition of enlightenment and a feature common to both practical and theoretical reason.

In my dissertation, my main aim is to ascertain the scope and limits of what Kant calls the "principle of publicity". The principle of publicity mainly serves to mediate between morality and politics. In this context, the "principle of publicity" functions as a criterion for the moral evaluation of political actions, policies, and legislation with respect to the rights of others. More specifically, the principle of publicity functions as a way of relating the underlying rationale (the private maxim) to the proposed political policy, legislation, or action. The negative version of the principle of publicity rules out, as being morally impermissible, those political ends and maxims that cannot be openly communicated to others, and must be kept secret in order to achieve the ends. The moral problem is not simply that a group of citizens might object to some proposed rationale and end, thus forestalling or frustrating the end, but the fact that the maxim cannot become a rule for acting for all citizens, i.e., cannot be universalized. In contrast, the positive principle of publicity applies to those maxims and ends that "require" publicity in order to bring about the ends, most significantly, the end of perpetual peace. Kant only provides a schematic presentation of the principle of publicity, and few authors have undertaken to fully explain this principle. While contributing a more thoroughgoing analysis and explanation of the nature of the principle of publicity, I also show that this specific form of publicity is connected to Kant's more general account of publicity as it pertains to the public use of reason and his enlightenment project.