Abstract:

The current investigation addresses the question of how metaphors and similes are understood. Existing models posit different mechanisms for metaphor comprehension. Some of these models postulate that metaphors such as Some lawyers are sharks are understood as implicit similes, via a comparison process. Other models posit that metaphors are processed as categorization statements, with the vehicle term shark referring to both a literal level, the marine creature with fins, and an abstract level, the class of vicious, predatory creatures, of which the literal shark is a prototype. The career of metaphor account posits a shift in processing from comparison to categorization as metaphors become conventionalized.

A critical assumption of the comparison and career of metaphor accounts is that similes and metaphors convey the same meaning and are interchangeable. The five experiments described in the current thesis provide evidence that speaks against this assumption. They show that some novel tropes, such as Some lawyers are well-paid sharks , may be privileged in metaphor over simile form and others, such as Some lawyers are ( like ) old sharks , may express different interpretations in simile and in metaphor form. I argue that apt metaphors (both novel and conventionalized) are understood as categorizations and that similes are processed as comparisons.