This exploratory study examines how Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS and EM) grant funding influences county public safety spending at the regional level. The literature has yet to consider the flypaper effect as it relates to DHS and EM grant funding. As such, I hypothesize a theoretical model which articulates how the presence of the flypaper effect suggests that local governments supplementing DHS and EM grant funding are more prepared than those governments who are not. In other words, local governments that respond to DHS and EM grant funding through supplanting may risk public safety through insufficient funding (Posner, 2003). To demonstrate, this study employs an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) fixed-effect model to analyze the fiscal responses from county governments to DHS and EM grant funding using panel data between FY1998 and FY2006. Overall, the results provide moderate evidence of a flypaper effect which suggests that county expenditures violate the fungibility of DHS and EM grants. The DHS and EM grants stimulated higher levels of public safety spending in that a one percent increase in DHS and EM grant funding equated to an overall average increase in public safety spending by 0.24 percent. Therefore, local governments appear to have adopted DHS and EM programs and do not appear to supplant this funding for more traditional local functions. Inferences regarding the level of local preparedness by virtue of this funding remain unclear. There is evidence that this funding has enhanced local capabilities to prevent, mitigate and respond to technological and human-induced hazards. However, there is also evidence to the contrary that point to supplantation. The issue of how to optimally finance DHS and EM programs will likely be the source of dispute in the foreseeable future. It is imperative to continue studying how to allocate this funding in such a manner that can maximize prevention and preparedness while minimizing consequences.