This study analyzes the effect the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 has on registered lobbying expenditures by the top 39 federal lobbying firms. Lobbying expenditures are treated as investments in political capital and the intent of this study is to see if government actions alter incentives to make this type of investment. After an analysis in which numerous lobbying and government related variables were analyzed the legislation was found to have a modest effect on firm revenue. This finding shows that government regulation can influence the way in which political capital is sought in Washington. The legislation put in place numerous regulations regarding lobbyist/Congressional interaction, expanded penalties for noncompliance and altered internal House and Senate rules. Because such a wide range of changes were made by the legislation it could not be determined if any one or select few regulations were responsible for the modest effect found. The most significant effect found on firm lobbying revenue was the level of federal spending during that year, suggesting that lobbying and federal spending have a reactionary relationship. This is relevant to policy because it suggests that the best strategy for limiting special interests' influence in Washington is to reduce the monetary scope of government, thus decreasing the potential returns for private actors on investments in political capital. Analysis is also conducted on the impact of variables controlling for number of registered lobbyists, number of bills introduced during a single Congress, and the party composition of both chambers on lobbying expenditures.